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Abstract: Despite international legal consensus declaring the separation wall in Palestine/Israel 
as illegal, Israel has continued this geopolitical project unchallenged. Examining the judicial 
decisions of the International Court of Justice and Israel’s High Court of Justice on the wall 
reveals that Israel’s project, which began in 2002, was motivated by a political desire to protect 
illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, confiscate Palestinian land, and constrict their 
movement and space. Analyzing the entirety of the wall through the lens of containment 
illuminates how the wall’s fracturing of Palestinian land created the material conditions, or the 
‘facts on the ground’, for Israel’s political objectives manifested in the Trump administration’s 
“deal of the century” announced in 2020. Comparing maps of the wall throughout Palestine to 
the map of the proposed future of Israel/Palestine by the recent plan, its juxtaposition reveals 
how Israel’s project set the foundation for actualizing further colonial land confiscation in 
Palestine. The result of judicial deliberation was a wall seen by Israel’s eye as humanitarianly 
and proportionally considered by its courts, which allowed it to withstand international criticism 
while maintaining its purpose to actualize its geopolitical objectives. 
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‘They’re Building A Wall’: The Separation Barrier in Palestine/Israel 
“Is it for this that we have established a country? Is it for this that we have gathered from 
every corner of the world, the survivors of regimes that persecuted us, discriminated against 
us and denied us every possible right simply because our origin, in order to establish a state 
whose army will implement a discriminatory regime over millions who are not us?” 
(Michael Sfard, 2006) 
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Fifteen years after the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion that declared Israel’s 
separation barrier in the West Bank as illegal under international law, Israel has continued this 
project relatively unchallenged.1 The planned route of the barrier, which includes sections already 
constructed, under construction, and awaiting construction, is some 435 miles long – more than 
twice the length of the Green Line, the internationally recognized border between Israel and the 
West Bank.2 In fact, 85 percent of the separation barrier is constructed in the West Bank without 
consultation of the Palestinian Authority leading to over a decade of legal challenges on the 
legitimacy of an occupying power significantly altering the territory in which it occupies.3 The wall 
symbolizes a dialectic of “an ever-radicalizing Palestinian struggle and an ever-deepening Israeli 
oppression, causing ever-growing levels of human misery, mainly – but not only – among 
Palestinians.”4 While there is a wide range of choices for terminology when discussing the separation 
barrier, anywhere from ‘security fence’ to ‘apartheid wall’, I will mainly refer to the structure as the 
separation barrier as “it constitutes a physical system of separation that includes several components, 
among them fences and walls”5, and more specifically a “series of wall; barrier; electric fences; and 
security zones of barbed wire, ditches, motion sensors, and surveillance cameras.”6 Though, I may 
use any of these terms interchangeably. This essay will perform three primary functions – first, to 
provide an explanation of the state of the second intifada before the implementation of the 
separation barrier to understand the context for its development. Second, this paper seeks to 
provide a historiography of the formation of the separation barrier, with a special emphasis on the 
role of both Israeli and international legal structures in influencing the barrier’s route and reception. 
Third, this paper explores the consequential effects and ramifications that the separation barrier has 
1 Yumna Patel, “15 years after ICJ declared Separation Wall illegal, West Bank barrier continues to destroy 
Palestinian lives”, Mondoweiss, 2019 July 10, Web.  
2 Rene Backmann, A Wall in Palestine (New York, NY: Picador, 2010), pp 4. 
3 Michael Sfard, The Wall and the Gate: Israel, Palestine, and the Legal Battle for Human Rights (New York, NY: 
Metropolitan Books, 2018), pp 327.  
4 O. Yiftachel & H. Yacobi, “Barriers, Walls and Dialectics: The Shaping of ‘Creeping Apartheid’ in 
Israel/Palestine,” in Against the Wall, ed. M Sorkin (New York, NY: The New Press, 2005), pp 139.  
5 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 260.  
6 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 3. 
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on individual Palestinians, the future possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state, and the ongoing 
colonial occupation of Palestine.  
 
The Second Intifada & the Separation Principle 
 The separation barrier was begun by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the midst of the 
second intifada. Just two months after the failure of the Camp David negotiations that left many 
prominent issues for Palestinians unaddressed, Sharon’s provocative visit to al-Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount on September 28, 2000 triggered Palestinian demonstrations and Israeli 
military suppression that compounded into a much bloodier intifada than the previous.7 Between 
September 28th 2000 and January 31st 2006, just under a thousand Israeli’s were killed in attacks or 
bombings, a majority civilians, in which the Ministry of Defense and Israeli politicians said “the 
objectives of the ‘security barrier’ were to prevent the infiltration of terrorists, forbid the entry of 
clandestine arms and explosives, and protect the lives of 6.7 million Israeli citizens.”8 It is important 
to note in the same period of time, Israeli military operations killed roughly 3,400 Palestinians. Due 
to political disagreement on the outline of the barrier, Sharon placed Netzah Mashiah, head of the 
Ministry of Defense, in charge to direct the construction of the barrier in the spring of 2002. 
Mashiah framed Israel’s stance on the separation barrier “from the principle that this barrier is 
temporary. And that the length of time it stays up depends on how the Palestinians work toward 
peace. So, it can stay here five minutes or five decades.”9  
Under the guise of protecting its citizens against suicide bombings and other terrorist 
attacks, Israel advanced a settlement plan that built a separation barrier mainly inside the West Bank. 
To construct the barrier, the Israeli military who occupies the West Bank issued land seizure military 
orders that seized private Palestinian land – a process that began even before the earliest 
government resolution approving the barrier.10 Though it was framed as temporary and a necessary 
security measure, the barrier’s deep construction into the West Bank shows how it’s planned route 
was “a political weapon to confiscate land and thus constrict Palestinian space,” functionally a 
 
7 Neve Gordon,  Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2008), pp 197.  
 
8 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 25-26. 
 
9 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 49. 
 
10 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 268.  
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controlling apparatus.11 The barrier’s construction toward the east of illegal Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank makes it easier for their potential annexation in the future. Israeli human rights attorney 
Michael Sfard describes that Israel’s separation barrier project “may hold the title for the most 
cynical manipulation of pain caused by suicide terrorism.”12 Fifteen years later, the separation barrier 
is much more of a permanent reality for Palestinians than temporary. Echoing Agamben’s insight on 
the analysis of the state of emergency, the separation barrier symbolizes a state of exception, where 
the state’s temporary suspension of the law becomes a state of permanence. In this way, when 
temporariness “is both the method and the law, the military can portray every action as a response 
to emergency and Israeli civilian society can ignore every evil.”13 The separation barrier was a part of 
Sharon’s broader disengagement plan that was a U-turn from both his personal stance and Israeli 
policy in the Occupied Territories (OT) that was result from: 
the contradictions of Israel’s regime have grown to a point where they can no longer be 
reconciled or ignored without escalating international and local costs. This has now required 
a major tactical change in order to maintain the Israeli ethnocratic system. The recent steps 
represent a new phase, a new method, to pursue an age-old goal of Zionism: to maximize 
the Judaization of Palestine while maintaining Israel’s image as a ‘normal’, democratic 
nation-state.14 
This change in the way in which Israel managed its occupation of the OT is demonstrated best by 
the separation barrier.  
 Prior to the first intifada, Israel controlled all aspects of Palestinian life under occupation. 
The Oslo period signified a transition from a colonization principle to a separation principle 
according to Israeli scholar Neve Gordon. Whereas the colonization principle is guided by 
biopolitics, or the power to manage and maintain life, the separation principle has been 
characterized by an abandonment of life, guided by the sovereign power’s ability to let or make die.15 
This dramatic change in the way in which Israel controls the OT wasn’t primarily from changes, 
 
11 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, pp 212.  
 
12 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 260.  
 
13 Eyal Weizman, “Hollow Land: The Barrier Archipelago and the Impossible Politics of Separation,” in 
Against the Wall, ed. M Sorkin, (New York, NY: The New Press, 2005), pp 238-239.  
 
14 Yiftachel & Yacobi, “Barriers, Walls and Dialectics,” pp 140.  
 
15 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, pp 2. 
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replacements, or modifications of controlling mechanisms and tactics – but rather, from a shift in 
emphasis on modes of power: biopower to sovereign power. The Oslo period demonstrated this 
shift toward the separation principle where Israel shed its biopolitical responsibility to administer the 
lives of Palestinians by “subcontracting” that role to the Palestinian Authority (PA) while retaining 
full control over security. Gordon highlights that this “signified the reorganization of power rather 
than its withdrawal and should be understood as the continuation of the occupation by other 
means”.16 In contrast from the colonization principle, the separation principle is solely interested in 
the resources in a colonized territory, and not the people on it. This is demonstrated by Israel’s 
military attacks on the PA and its’ infrastructure during the second intifada, rendering its own 
subcontractor totally dysfunctional. In this way, Palestinians represent the homo sacer: one who may 
be killed without due process and without the killer being punished.17 
 
Judicial Challenges & Legitimacy 
The role of law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a hierarchical quagmire of different 
layers of legal applicability. Law in the OT is composed of what was in effect prior to Israel’s 
occupation (Jordanian and Egyptian laws, British Mandate laws before that, and Ottoman laws 
before that), Israeli military law, Israeli administrative law, and international laws of occupation.18 
Though Israel has maintained the position that the OT are “disputed” territory, and therefore un-
applicable to the laws of occupation, the majority of the international community recognizes the 
occupation and Israel has already voluntarily took up humanitarian provisions of these laws. Legal 
institutions have had a significant influence on the separation barrier, both internally to resolve 
conflicts and externally to determine international legality. Because Israel’s military commander in 
the OT can decree new legislative orders, such as for the confiscation of Palestinian land and/or the 
construction of the separation barrier, legal petitions challenging such actions by the Israeli military 
were heard by Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ). The HCJ has been an instrument in regulating 
the occupation and alleviating the worst effects of military violence, “in doing so to aid the Israeli 
state’s argument that it applies the rule of law fairly and indifferently in all cases, including those of 
 
16 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, pp 200. 
 
17 S Hanafi, “Spacio-cide and Bio-Politics: The Israeli Colonial Project from 1947 to the Wall,” in Against the 
Wall, ed. M Sorkin, (New York, NY: The New Press, 2005), pp 167.  
 
18 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 44.  
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occupied Palestinians.”19 In order to understand how the HCJ has either contributed or damaged 
human rights, “one must examine the Court’s role in strengthening or weakening the occupation as 
a legal and political entity… the assessor of the Court’s jurisprudence and of human rights legal 
activity will have to consider the effect they both have on the sustainability and durability of the 
occupation.”20 
 The High Court of Justice is the administrative bench to the Israeli Supreme Court and 
considers direct civilian petitions against state authorities. The HCJ has the power to issue 
injunctions, mandatory orders, and other orders commanding state and local authorities to act or 
refrain from acting.21 The HCJ became the site of internal legal challenges to the construction of the 
separation barrier, balancing security concerns of the Israeli state and military and the rights of 
Palestinians on the other. One of the first prominent cases that the HCJ ruled on came from a 
petition from Palestinian villagers from Beit Sourik, just north-west outside Jerusalem. The Israeli 
military’s route and construction for the part of the separation barrier in question left 43 percent of 
the Beit Sourik villagers cultivable land west of the separation barrier, on the ‘Israeli side’.22 The 
HCJ’s role was to an issue a judgement on whether the military commander had the power to seize 
private Palestinian land to build the separation barrier, and whether the barrier’s route was lawfully 
set. The petitioners argued the motivation behind the separation barrier wasn’t simply security, but a 
political desire to envelop illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank into Israel – or de facto 
annexation – among the other harms it brought the villagers. On the first legal question, the HCJ 
lead by Chief Justice Barak reiterated Israel’s position that the seizure of private Palestinian land is 
allowed for security purposes, as granted by 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and therefore rejected charges of annexation.23 On the second question, the HCJ sided 
with the petitioners argument – that the original route causes irreparable harm to Palestinian 
villagers, their rights, and livelihoods. The legal challengers made their argument through an 
 
19 Eyal Weizman, “The Best of All Possible Walls.,” in The Least of All Possible Evils: A Short History of 
Humanitarian Violence (London, UK: Verso, 2011), pp 76.  
 
20 Michael Sfard, “The Price of Internal Legal Opposition to Human Rights Abuses,” Journal of Human Rights 
Practice 1, no. 1 (2009): 37-50.  
 
21 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 40.  
 
22 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 134.  
 
23 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 294.  
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alternative route proposal that addresses the proportional limits of security concerns and Palestinian 
rights better than the military’s original route. Proportionality became a defining feature in legal 
challenges to the separation barrier, “balancing the accrued common good of one population against 
the lesser evil done to another population.”24 In this way, the legal challengers to the separation 
barrier itself demonstrated a potential lesser evil alternative that manifested in what Weizman calls 
“the best of all possible walls”, extending it humanitarian legitimacy. The HCJ struck down 75 
percent of the military’s route (some 18 miles of the barrier) in light of plausible alternatives to 
accommodate Palestinians petitions in June 2004. Seven months later, the Israeli military proposed 
another route that would only cut off the Beit Sourik villagers from some 7 square miles of their 
land, but when the villagers from Beit Sourik petitioned again, the court maintained the military’s 
second route.25  
 Beyond Israeli courts, the separation barrier was also receiving international attention and 
deliberation. In 2003, the UN special rapporteur of the Palestinian Occupied Territories issued a 
report that found the barrier unlawful for the reason of de facto annexation, the grave harm to 
Palestinian rights, and the absence of a legitimate military need to deviate from the Green Line 
(given the illegality of the settlements). A United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 
followed the report demanding Israel dismantle any part of the separation barrier that deviates from 
the internationally recognized border, but the US invoked its veto power. On December 8, 2003 the 
UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) “which does not have the enforcement power of an operative order,” but 
“could cause Israel significant diplomatic difficulties.”26 Different from how the Israeli courts 
considered the barrier, the ICJ ruled on the entirety of the separation barrier rather than a section-
by-section analysis that the HCJ followed (which also allows multiple legal challenges and results). 
Further, the ICJ also focused on the concern of settlements that the HCJ carefully avoided ruling on, 
in which the ICJ re-iterated the international community’s stance that the illegal settlements cannot 
be a justification for the barrier’s illegal deviation from the Green Line.27 Finding that 80 percent of 
 
24 Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, pp 73.  
 
25 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 134. 
 
26 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 283. 
 
27 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 300.  
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Israeli settlers would reside within the fenced and walled area, the ICJ argued this demonstrates a 
political motivation to create a fait accompli where the land west of the barrier, but east of the Green 
Line (the seam zone) is under Israeli control. The advisory opinion was 64 pages long and had five 
conclusions: first, that the separation barrier project violates international law; second, Israel should 
dismantle the barrier and undo legislation and regulations concerning it; third, Israel should pay 
reparations for the damages the wall has caused; fourth, all states should recognize Israel’s barrier 
construction as illegal and not aid or assist them; and fifth, the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council should consider how to end the illegal situation the advisory opinion notes.28 Eleven days 
after the ICJ submitted its advisory opinion, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-
10/15 during an emergency session that demanded that Israel and all UN member states comply 
with their legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion and requests that the secretary-general 
establish a register of damage caused. However, UN General Assembly resolutions are not binding, 
and the Security Council never voted on a resolution on the content of the advisory opinion after its 
release. The ICJ’s advisory opinion in June 2004 represented the international consensus on the 
legality of Israel’s separation barrier project, isolating Israel in its defense of ignoring international 
law. Interestingly, the High Court of Justice’s ruling on the Beit Sourik case came nine days before 
the ICJ’s advisory opinion – both judgements, so close to each other, didn’t regard the other.  
 The Israeli courts, such as the HCJ, do not only listen to the petitions from Palestinians, but 
begrudged Israeli settlers as well. Such was the case when the Alfei Menashe settlers petitioned the 
Court on the original June 2002 barrier route that would have left them outside it. Their petition 
resulted in the HCJ re-routing the fence to include the settlement in the barrier’s enclave, but 
resulted in the Palestinian towns of Qalqilyah and Habla to be cut apart by the re-route of the 
barrier.29 The Association of Civil Rights (ACRI), an Israeli NGO, offered legal aid to the 
Palestinians affected, borrowing arguments made in the recent ICJ advisory opinion. Their argument 
was that the barrier’s re-routing was unlawful because it caused a disproportionate violation on 
Palestinian rights, failed to meet a genuine security need, and amounted to de facto annexation. On 
whether Israel has to protect the rights of settlers, such as those in Alfei Menashe, their response 
was “Military need serves the occupying power or its forces, not its citizens who choose to relocate 
to the OT; their protection should not involve impingements on the rights of the occupied 
 
28 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 198. 
 
29 Weizman, “Hollow Land,” pp 231. 
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population.”30 In fact, the human rights organization B’tselem estimated the barrier would negatively 
affect the livelihood of at least 300,000 Palestinians and irreversibly damage the economic prospects 
of a future Palestinian state.31 In the HCJ’s judgement in September 2005, Barak’s opinion rejected 
the totalizing view of the barrier, maintaining that a segment-by-segment analysis was necessary to 
consider the military’s security narrative for the routing. He maintained the security justification for 
land seizures for barrier construction but rejected only certain parts of the fence to appease both 
Palestinian petitioners and the Israeli public.32  
 An issue with applying international law of war such as the 1907 Hague Convention to 
Israel/Palestine, according to Eyal Weizman, is that  
it presumes separate and defined states. Symmetrical wars between state actors can be long 
but tend to have clear beginnings and ends. In contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, like 
other past and present colonial conflicts, is an ever- and always present asymmetrical, low-
intensity conflict between a state and quasi-state actors.33 
But in effect, the HCJ’s rulings allowed military/security needs granted under Hague Convention 
proportionally to the rights Israel must protect of the occupied population under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. When completed, 85 percent of Israeli settlers will have the barrier protecting them. It 
was only due to legal challenges to the HCJ that slimmed the estimated 16 percent of land in the 
West Bank that would be trapped between the 1967 border and the separation barrier to 8 percent.34 
The judgements issued in notable cases such as Beit Sourik, Alfei Menashe, Zufin, and Bil’in were 
exceptions in the fact that they provided some relief to Palestinian petitioners. But the end results 
were final barrier routes with the HCJ’s seal of approval, demonstrating how legal activism against 
the barrier has helped Israel maintain legitimacy on the question.35 The metric of proportionality in 
the application of international law on the separation barrier represents “elastic zones of discretion” 
where the lesser evil argument is used to “subvert the law’s absolute provisions and subject them to 
 
30 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 305.  
 
31 Weizman, “Hollow Land,” pp 232. 
 
32 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 311-312.  
 
33 Weizman, “Hollow Land,” pp 239. 
 
34 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 327. 
 
35 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 329. 
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malleable cost-benefit calculations.”36 While some individual redress was made for Palestinian 
villages through legal challenges, the process resulted in the construction of the best of all possible walls 
that maintains legitimacy despite international legal opinion saying otherwise.  
 
Containment & ‘Creeping Apartheid’ 
 The separation barrier has resulted in a series of material harms to Palestinians and 
constitutes a broader ‘containment’ strategy by the Israeli state. The imposed permit regime that 
authorizes movement around the barrier and through the series of checkpoints throughout the West 
Bank constrains Palestinians freedom of movement. Whereas Israelis can travel through the seam 
zone with no need of a permit, Palestinians are only allowed legal entry in the seam zone if they have 
received a military issued permit that can take up to a year to obtain – leaving parts of the West 
Bank inaccessible. As result, the seam zone is governed on the basis of separation and discrimination 
off of nationality and amounts to de facto annexation of the seam zone for predominantly Israeli 
use.37 The separation barrier and its series of checkpoints and obstacles have ravaged the Palestinian 
economy. From 2000 to 2007 the unemployment rate in the West Bank rose from 15 percent to 17 
percent respectively, while close to 800,000 residents of the West Bank needed UN food assistance 
in 2008. Further, the Palestinian GDP declined 10 percent between 2006 to 2007, and another 10 
percent between 2007 to 2008.38 Beyond economic implications, a UN document from September 
2008 found that 60 percent of Palestinians attempting to enter Jerusalem to go to the al-Aqsa 
mosque during Ramadan were not authorized and were denied access.39 The result of the separation 
barrier project is a strategy that maintains Jewish demographic majority, minimizes interaction and 
maximizes separation, and acquires colonial possessions via de facto annexation or the possibility of 
annexation beyond East Jerusalem in the future. The barrier’s massive deviation from the Green 
Line underscores that a major objective is to create facts on the ground that essentially redraw the 
border between Israel and the West Bank. The route “aims to mitigate the consequences of Israel’s 
massive settlement project, whose goal has been to colonize the land without incorporating the 
 
36 Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, pp 91. 
 
37 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 269. 
 
38 Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 139.  
 
39 Ibid.  
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occupied inhabitants into the Israel demos.”40 Overall, the separation barrier functions as a system 
of containment.  
 Many concepts and theories have been used to describe and understand the separation 
barrier’s role in the ongoing colonial occupation of Palestine. The unilateral imposition of the barrier 
to demarcate ethnocratic lines and distinctions has drawn claims that Israel is moving closer to 
“creeping apartheid”.41 Unfolding without any declaration, ethnic stratification is creeping both 
outwards (in the expansionist sense discussed) and inwards (with increased legal controls on 
Palestinian Israeli citizens). This has even been described as spacio-cidal, as opposed to genocidal, in 
that it “targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian 
population, primarily by targeting the space in which the Palestinian people live.”42 Demonstrated by 
the military issuing land seizure orders, this process of spacio-cide is an attempt to seize and 
‘Judaize’ as much land as possible, and isolate Palestinians into the smallest space possible through 
containment. The separation barrier symbolizes the way in which the law is used to legitimate this 
colonial violence. International law, Israeli law, and the systems of courts are not spaces outside of 
the conflict, but rather battlegrounds internal to it. Weizman describes this as lawfare, when the law 
is used as a weapon of war, as a “strategy of using, or misusing, law as a substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve an operational objective.”43 Drawing from Walter Benjamin’s observations 
on military violence as “primordial and paradigmatic of all violence”, Weizman shows the separation 
barrier’s violence has also embodied a lawmaking character.  
 The containment strategy has profound implications for the future national aspirations for a 
Palestinian state. Instead of a complete strategy of separation, the barrier created an archipelago of 
isolated areas that would mean any future Palestinian state would be landlocked and contained by an 
Israeli state.44 Prioritizing retaining areas of high Jewish presence and shedding responsibility for 
high Arab populated areas, not only does this reify ethnic divisions and separation but it 
concentrates “Palestine” into three to five main regions (including the Gaza Strip) almost completely 
 
40 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, pp 217. 
 
41 Yiftachel & Yacobi, “Barriers, Walls and Dialectics,” pp 141. 
 
42 Hanafi, “Spacio-cide and Bio-Politics,” pp 159. 
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closed off from one another.45 The legal processes’ consideration of proportionality “forensically 
engineered” the separation barrier. If it does mark the territory of a future Palestinian state, it would 
be the first time humanitarian lawyers co-designed the borders.46 When alternative routes of the 
barrier were approved to alleviate some Palestinian harm, the end route is seen as a feature of the 
banality of participatory design “rather than seeing that as a part of the same instruments of brutal 
violation, repression, and dispossession.”47 Another way to see the containment strategy is to 
prevent a Palestinian state from coming to fruition in the first place. The separation barrier creates 
contradictions in both a potential one or two state solution, a fuite en avant.48 Prime Minister Sharon’s 
senior advisor, Weisglass, said: 
the meaning of the disengagement plan is a freeze to the diplomatic process with the 
Palestinians… When you freeze the political process, you prevent the establishment of a 
Palestinian state and you prevent a discussion on the subject of refugees, borders and 
Jerusalem… The vast majority of West Bank settlers will stay in their place forever… This 
whole package called ‘the Palestinian state’ has been removed from the daily agenda for an 
unlimited period of time.49  
Whether a future Palestinian state remains an unimaginable reality or a potential possibility, Israel 
has utilized the separation barrier for a geopolitical strategy of containment that maximizes the 
interests of Israelis over the rights and future of Palestinians.  
 
Conclusion 
 Michael Sfard recalls Abraham Heschel’s words that “In a free society, some are guilty, all 
are responsible.” He connects this distinction between guilt and responsibility to the Jewish notion 
of tikkun olam, or healing the world.50 The process of engaging in healing is only possible if all take 
responsibility, regardless of the culpability or guilt of oneself. What does tikkun olam mean or look 
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like in regards to the separation barrier? At the very least, it begins with a recognition that the 
separation barrier is not merely a benign, temporary security feature but a geopolitically motivated 
infrastructure of control, whose function is to expand colonial acquisitions and contain, isolate, and 
restrict Palestinians. In November 2007, in an exchange of words between Sfard and the HCJ’s 
President Beinisch during a hearing, Beinisch asked “Must we use this word?” in reference to the 




51 Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 333. 
